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Abstract 
Microfinance, the tool for poverty alleviation had gone through a paradigm shift as a result of the wave of 
commercialization of microfinance providers. Increased focus to financial goals and the dreaded trade-off from 
the pursuance of social outreach goals could force microfinance service providers (MFPs) to the mission drift. To 
solve the entangled puzzle of mutuality between the social outreach and financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan, 
this study empirically analyses the impact of outreach on financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan by using a 
sample of 38 MFPs for the period of 1998-2014. Results suggest that there is significant and positive association 
between depth of outreach and financial performance. The empirical evidence signaled no trade-off between depth 
of outreach and financial performance. Results showed the achievement of dual mission for MFPs is possible, as 
the depth of outreach had a significant positive effect on the financial performance of MFPs in the context of 
Pakistan. Findings remain consistent by using alternative proxies of financial performance.  
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1.Introduction 
Microfinance (MF) is a financial system, initially designed to alleviate poverty, by providing loan facilities to the 
poorest strata of society, so that, they can get better options of earning by improving their businesses with the help 
of these MF loans (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; Mia & Chandran, 2016). United Nations and World Bank, 
along with other global organizations for the developmental mission of the world, have recognized microfinance 
as tool for reducing poverty due to which MF industry is growing and spreading, especially in developing nations 
(Mia & Chandran, 2016). Microfinance is the advanced form of initial microcredit services, with commercial 
incentives by its organizers (Khandakar & Danopoulos, 2004).  
Pursuance of financial sustainability and accessing the poor for financial solutions by microfinance providers 
(MFPs) are the two focuses that have been termed as “the institutionalist approach” and “the welfarist approach”, 
respectively (G. M. Woller, Dunford, & Woodworth, 1999). The advocates of institutionalist view stress upon the 
importance of financial performance as a mean to provide long term access of financial services to poor. Whereas, 
the welfarist believes the outreach to poor should be given preference and the financial sustainability and 
profitability should not come at the cost of less outreach to poor (Hermes & Lensink, 2007).  According to Rhyne 
(1998), these two camps, which are considered opposite to each other, basically share the same basic purpose of 
providing microfinance services to the deprived poor. Furthermore, he added that focus on sustainability is 
necessary to keep this provision of services smoothly without having dependence on subsidies provided by 
different donors, agencies, and governments because the continuous supply of subsidies in the future is not sure.  
MFPs’ performance can be gauged through financial sustainability and social outreach (Yaron, 1994).  Social 
outreach and financial performance, which can be referred as performing societal benevolence function through 
the delivery of financial services to deprived and sustainability function through creating enough revenues to meet 
their costs (Conning, 1999; Robert Cull & Morduch, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Mia & Chandran, 2016). Various 
costs augment as a result of microfinance activity, such as screening, monitoring, and disbursement of loans to 
poor and women. The fear of increase in these associated costs may cause a shift in the focus on social goals that 
may harm the sustainability and profitability of MFPs. This may ultimately harm the simultaneous achievement 
of “dual bottom line” of social outreach to poor and financial performance. 
The ‘schism’ between the institutionalist approach and the welfarist approach necessitates further empirical 
investigations of the possibility of achievement of ‘dual mission’ (Morduch, 2000). Empirical studies on global 
level by Quayes (2015), Abdullah and Quayes (2016), have reported a positive effect of increase in social outreach 
on financial performance. Whereas, Robert Cull and Morduch (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) and Pedrini and Ferri 
(2016) noted evidence of a trade-off between social outreach and financial performances, Meyer (2019) found no 
significant effect of social outreach on financial performance of MFPs. Nasrin, Rasiah, Baskaran, and Masud (2018) 
in their country-level study also found synergetic effects of outreach measures and the financial performance of 
MFPs.  
The presence of the mixed arguments necessitates further empirical investigations of the phenomenon how 
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the social outreach and financial performance interact with each other in the presence of varying macro and 
microeconomic settings on different regional levels. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine 
the impact of increase in social outreach on financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan, considering the outreach 
level to poor as a policy matter by management and unaffected by financial performance. Pakistan is a lower-
middle-income developing country with its own distinct macroeconomic environment, micro-economic conditions, 
clients’ needs, and repayment behaviors. This study is based on supply side measures of social outreach financial 
performance and employs multivariate regression analyses using an unbalanced panel data of 38 microfinance 
providers from 1998-2014, to better understand phenomenon interaction between social outreach and financial 
performance, in the distinct environment of Pakistan.  
This study contributes to the existing microfinance research literature and to the debate of tradeoff and 
mission drift in several ways. The interaction between social outreach and financial performance will give further 
insights into whether the financial performance behaves the same or different from the global or other regions. 
The marginal contribution of the current study is to theoretically establish a causal connection and empirically 
analyze the impact of social outreach on the financial performance of microfinance providers in the context of 
Pakistan. It is empirically evident from the results that the pursuit of depth of social outreach by MFPs may not 
necessarily go against the financial performance goals and the dual mission is achievable if the MFPs remain cost 
efficient and vigilant regarding repayment risks. We found no signal of tradeoff between depth of outreach and 
financial performance. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulate 
hypotheses on the basis literature review. Section 3 give the details of data, variable definitions and the 
methodology adopted. Sections 4 describe the empirical findings and discussion. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Microfinance was initially developed as a tool targeted to serve the poor, who had been denied access by 
commercial banks due to the absence of collateral, to help them raise their living standards by promoting access 
to better economic opportunities to earn their livelihoods (Christen, Lyman, & Rosenberg, 2003; Khandakar & 
Danopoulos, 2004; Schreiner, 1998). The set of microfinance services includes small loans, saving facility and 
insurance services. Microfinance providers include government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
traditional banks, cooperative societies and organizations of other types for-profit and non-profit organizations 
(Brau & Woller, 2004; Christen et al., 2003). The costs associated with microfinance service provision to poor are 
high due to the fixed costs of disbursement to loan, higher exposure to risks associated with the small and micro 
businesses, monitoring and administrative costs (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
2014). subsidies help MFPs to overcome the costs related to microfinance provision that would be uncovered by 
their operating incomes (Rhyne, 1998; Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014). With the purpose of saving the 
poorest from being leftover or unserved by MFPs, donors and governments should raise the level of subsidies 
provided (Kai, 2009).   
According to Battilana and Dorado (2010) Microfinance (MF) has gone through a paradigm shift from a 
developmental initiative to a commercial drive, with increased focus toward financial goals than the social goal, 
and many of the providers of MF have been converted to banks from NGOs like Banco Sol and Los Andes. 
Furthermore, they added that the reason behind the shift was the need for additional capital requirements and to 
fulfill the goals of commercial investors and stakeholders. Under commercial logics, to cover the huge associated 
costs of provision of microfinance services, MFPs focus financial sustainability and charge higher rate of interest 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010). To fulfill the social goal of microfinance these organizations have to focus on outreach 
as well. The simultaneous achievement of “double -bottom line” that is to increase social outreach and boost 
financial performance, inherits a risk of “mission drift” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
Social outreach refers to the content of MFPs to cater the need of more and more poor and the poorest of poor, 
termed as breadth of outreach and depth of outreach, respectively (Conning, 1999). Financial performance is the 
sustainability and profitability of MFPs that is attained by the ability to survive in the business and covering all of 
the associated costs on their own (Conning, 1999). The institutional logic drives the MFPs for wider breadth of 
outreach or more number of users with a possible larger loan size to attain the financial performance and 
sustainability, whereas, the developmental logic thrusts the MFPs to deepen their outreach by providing access to 
the poorer of poor, and women with a possible smaller loan size (Schreiner, 2002). 
Among others two commonly used proxies of outreach are breadth of outreach, which is the number of users 
of microfinance, and the depth of outreach which is the percentage of women borrower or the average size of loan 
outstanding to the poor (Bibi, Balli, Matthews, & Tripe, 2018; Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega, & 
Rodriguez-meza, 2000). Because the commonly used proxies of breadth and depth have their own merits and 
demerits and the limitations of availability of data there has been the need to develop more efficient proxies (Bibi 
et al., 2018; Hermes & Hudon, 2018). Bibi et al. (2018) developed the two new efficient measures of outreach, 
“market share of borrowers (MSB)” for breadth of outreach and “Market share of borrowers adjusted by market 
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share of MP’s assets (MSBA)” for depth of outreach   
According to Daher and Le Saout (2015), financial performance is the process of gauging the outcomes of 
various activities performed and the policies and strategies undertaken by MFPs in terms of money through 
profitability and sustainability. Profitability refers to the ability to produce better monetary outputs using the 
employed assets whereas sustainability is the ability to be in the business in the long run (Daher & Le Saout, 2015).  
A schism creates from the dreaded trade-off between the MFPs’ contend to focus on social outreach and to 
strive for financial performance (Morduch, 2000). The conflicting approaches, sometimes, have been referred as 
of institutionalist approach and welfarists approach (G. Woller, 2002). Financial performance is the primary 
objective of this institutionalist or financial system approach and it is also supported by international organizations 
of the World Bank and Consultative Group to Assist Poor (Bassem, 2012). Proponents of this view mainly stress 
upon the coverage of costs related to the provision of access to MF services to poor by the MFPs because the 
subsidies given by donors are limited and are uncertain in continuity for long run, hence, the MFPs must target 
sustainability and profitability as a tool to let them available a provider of MF services to poor over the long haul 
(Rhyne, 1998). From the study of literature, it seems that the “mission drift” from the societal development 
objectives to self- sustainability of MFPs may become unavoidable (Hermes et al., 2011), although, this trade-off 
can be minimized if MFPs become cost-efficient, as identified by Lopatta, Tchikov, Jaeschke, and Lodhia (2017), 
Mersland and Strøm (2010).  
The welfarist or the developmental approach stresses the importance of sticking with the original mission to 
provide financial access to poorest of the poor (Woller, 2002). The protagonists of welfarists approach have 
concerns with the sustainability focus and fear that it might lead to a mission drift (Hermes & Lensink, 2011; Kar, 
2013). Most of the MFPs are not sustainable and the uncertainty about the supply of subsidies and the lack of 
subsidies can lead MFPs to the “mission drift” and less social outreach by charging higher interest rates and 
targeting less depth of outreach by giving larger average loan size per borrower, targeting fewer female borrowers 
and less poor (D’Espallier, Hudon, & Szafarz, 2013, 2017). Financial performance of MFPs can be assessed 
through sustainability which is state of having uninterrupted stream of reasonable profits cash-inflows to mitigate 
the risks of being bankrupt (Semaw Henock, 2019).  
Armendáriz and Szafarz (2009) argued that mission drift results from the interaction of MFPs’ goals, variance 
of the costs among poverty-stricken and affluent customers and the local features of customers, rather than 
“progressive lending” or “cross-subsidization”. Financial performance of MFPs can be assessed through 
sustainability which is state of having uninterrupted stream of reasonable profits cash-inflows to mitigate the risks 
of being bankrupt (Semaw Henock, 2019). Focusing the balance between self-sustainability and societal 
development that has been recognized as “dual mission” or “double-bottom line” in literature, and it is yet 
unresolved whether this balance is achievable for MFPs or not (Begoña Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & 
Molinero, 2007; Mia & Chandran, 2016; Nasrin et al., 2018). 
Contexts and fixed characteristics of MFPs may affect the vulnerability of a probable trade-off from the 
concurrent pursuance of social outreach and financial performance objectives (Wry & Zhao, 2018). Some MFPs 
can cope with the “dual mission” efficiently and effectively than the other, with the help of sound skilled 
management and practices, combined with lower cultural hindrances to outreach like lower discrimination to poor 
and women clients and solid market-supporting institutions like property rights, the rule of law, and regulatory 
regimes as Wry and Zhao (2018) found a negative relationship between social outreach pursuance and financial 
performance and varying contexts can magnify, extenuate or countermand this relationship.  
Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006) insisted upon the preference of social outreach as a primary objective of 
MFPs despite the existence of a mixed opinion upon social outreach aspirations of MFPs and their efficiency. 
According to Robert Cull and Morduch (2007), MFPs can uphold an equilibrium between social outreach and 
financial performance, concurrently, by remaining cautious about absolute poor.  Quayes (2012) found a 
statistically significant, positive association amid depth of outreach and financial performance. Paxton (2003) 
found no substitution between the aspiration of outreach and financial performance. Whereas, the trade-off of 
outreach and FP, had also been found empirically evident by Makame and Murinde (2006). 
Considering the mixed arguments and evidence mentioned above, this study aims is to investigate the 
relationship between increase in social outreach and financial performance of MFPs in the context of Pakistan. 
Pakistan has distinct macroeconomy and microeconomic environment from the rest of the developing world. The 
continuous political instability, poor governance, terrorism, and energy crisis affected the whole economy 
negatively that in turn inflicted the rise poverty level and unemployment for poor and women in country. Therefore, 
Pakistan is the most suitable and deserving geographic location to apply the poverty alleviation tools of 
Microfinance resultantly increase the income-generating opportunities for poor and women. Microfinance 
institutions (MFPs) established in Pakistan with commercial logics or institutional approaches are considered to 
be inclined toward mission drift due the feared tradeoff between the presence of social outreach and financial 
performance of MFPs.  Therefore, this study is a little effort to help bridge the gap between the commonly 
considered conflicted approaches testing the impact of social outreach with traditional and newly developed 
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indicators of outreach on the financial performance of MFPs.  
While there are arguments that women borrowers show better repayment behavior than men borrower which 
is considered and boosts MFPs performance, there are some researchers who do not have the same propositions 
(Morduch & Armendariz, 2005). Boehe and Barin Cruz (2013) analyzed the data from 22 countries from Africa, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia and found evidence against the common prediction of outreach to women 
enhances the MFPs performance. D'Espallier, Guerin, and Mersland (2013) found the emphasis on female 
borrowers have significant positive effect on the repayments but the financial performance is not improved. These 
female borrowers are usually offered relatively microloans which could be the reason for higher costs incurred by 
MFPs and the improved repayments are not translated into better financial performance.  
Based on the above discussion, there is evidence of positive, negative and no effect of percentage of women 
borrowers on financial performance. The purpose of this study is to find out the effect of percentage of women 
borrowers on financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan. The research question in the study is whether there is a 
significant relationship between percentage of women borrower and the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan. 
This study proposes the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant association of the percentage of women borrowers on the financial 
performance of MFPs in the context of Pakistan.  
Researchers have found a mixed relationship of average loan size with financial performance (Hulme & 
Mosley, 1996; Paxton & Cuevas, 2002; Quayes, 2015; Schreiner, 2002; G. Woller, 2002). The smaller average 
loan size will be expected to have negative impact on financial indicators because deepening the outreach with the 
smaller loan size is complemented with increased costs, and ultimately negative effect on profit margins and a 
trade-off may result as a consequence of deeper outreach through smaller loans. On the contrary, Quayes (2015), 
argued that the smaller loan size can enhance the repayment rate. If this increased repayment rate outweighs the 
increased costs associated with smaller loans then it can be ultimately translated into better financial performance. 
Quayes (2012) found a significantly positive association between increased depth of outreach and financial 
performance. Quayes (2015) found the financial performance got better with the decrease in average loan size. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) argues that the average loan size may tend to increase as the MFPs age matures, 
it may not be, necessarily, a sign of “mission drift”. Meyer (2019), in a global level study, found that smaller 
average loan size/GNI have significant association with higher yield and profit margin, but, no association with 
ROA, ROE, and OSS because of an approximately equal off-setting effect of increased costs. On the contrary, 
Nasrin et al. (2018) found a significant positive impact of loan size on yield and profit margin.  
Considering the mixed arguments above, present study aspires to find the answer to the question, how the 
average outstanding loan size per borrower affects the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan and proposes 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Average outstanding loan size per borrower has a significant relationship with the financial 
performance of MFPs in the context of Pakistan.  
There are mixed arguments on the relationship between outreach and financial performance. Studies by 
Bassem (2012), R. Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), Pedrini and Ferri (2016) and Hermes et al. (2011) 
have confirmed the negative association between large outreach and financial performance. Whereas, Adhikary 
and Papachristou (2014), B. Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero (2009), (Louis, Seret, & Baesens, 
2013), and Quayes (2012, 2015) have reported positive effect of an increase in outreach on financial performance. 
There is also some evidence of insignificant effect of outreach on financial performance conveyed by Lebovics, 
Hermes, and Hudon (2016) and Meyer (2019). 
Hermes and Hudon (2018) conducted a systematic review of 169 high-quality studies to examine the factors 
which affect the social performance and financial performance of MFPs and to explore the association between 
the two. Their study revealed that it is still a debatable issue that which measures can best represent social 
performance of MFPs. They suggested that the dense phenomena of social performance should be proxied by an 
amalgamation of indicators of breadth of outreach, depth of outreach and outreach to women and poor. According 
to them the diverse techniques and measures used to evaluate the performance in the microfinance field are derived 
from the parent areas of banking and finance research. Furthermore, their study identified the traditional measures 
used in literature do not fully represent performance and are only indirect proxies. The divergence and the 
disagreement on the best measure(s) to use for the evaluation of microfinance performance, stems the need to 
cultivate and foster new indicators and to improve old proxies. To overcome the issues and drawbacks in the 
traditional proxies of breadth and depth of social performance, identified by previous studies, Bibi et al. (2018) 
developed new measures, “market share of microfinance borrowers” (MSB) and “market share of the number of 
borrowers adjusted for market share of assets” (MSBA) representing breadth of outreach and depth of outreach, 
respectively.  
Given the diverse arguments, present study also intends to answer the question of how the new measures of 
outreach, MSB and MSBA, affect the financial performance of MFPs in the context of Pakistan.  
The study hypothesizes the followings: 
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Hypothesis 3: MSB has a significant relationship with the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 4: MSBA has a significant relationship with the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database is the source of the current study’s data related to 
microfinance variables. The MIX is an international non-profit data platform for microfinance industry. It hosts 
data shared voluntarily by its member MFPs around the world. Data from MIX are extensively used in literature 
of microfinance (Bassem, 2009; Kulkarni, 2017; Meyer, 2019). Macroeconomic data related to Pakistan were 
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Datafile for current study used for regression analysis 
contained observations from the year 1998 to 2014 of 38 MFPs in Pakistan.   
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
To measure the effect of social outreach on the FP of MFPs in Pakistan, among the dependent variables, current 
study deployed rate of return on assets (ROA), Profit margin ratio (PM), Yield on gross portfolio nominal (YLD) 
and Yield on gross portfolio real (YLDR). 
ROA as a proxy of FP to gauge profitability calculated as the ratio of net operating income and total assets 
(Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Arrassen, 2017; Assefa, Hermes, & Meesters, 2013; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Meyer, 
2019; Rosenberg, 2009) ROA signals MFPs’ capabilities of producing sound rate of returns that can keep the 
investors satisfied and of survival as to be in the business of microfinance (Adhikary & Papachristou, 2014). 
Profitability can be translated as a gesture of institutional logic dominance whereas the lower levels can be a sign 
of welfarist approach followed by MFPs (Im & Sun, 2015).  
PMR is the ratio of net operating income by operating revenue, used as another proxy of FP of MFPs, that 
shows the percentage of income is from every unit of revenue earned (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Meyer, 2019; 
Nasrin et al., 2018).  
YLD can serve the function of proxy of FP of MFPs representing the nominal income earned from interest 
rates and fees charged by the MFPs on the loan portfolio outstanding (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Arrassen, 2017; 
Kulkarni, 2017; Meyer, 2019). YLDR is an the ex-ante proxy of interest rates that shows the total income from 
real interest rates and fees charged by the MFPs on the loan portfolio outstanding, used as measure of FP of MFPs 
(Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Arrassen, 2017; Assefa et al., 2013; Robert Cull & Morduch, 2007; Kulkarni, 2017; 
Meyer, 2019) 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Outreach tells how well the social performance of MFPs is in the provision of its services to the poor and it can be 
proxied through the quantity and kinds of users of MFPs’ services (Meyer, 2019). It is the scale and level of poverty 
being accessed for the provision of financial services (Reichert, 2018). The “poverty approach” lays stress on 
deepening the outreach, whereas, widening the breadth of outreach is the target for MFPs under the “sustainability 
approach” Schreiner (2002). Depth of social outreach and breadth of social outreach, are the key focus variables 
in present study, jointly compose social performance (Conning, 1999).  
Depth of outreach shows the socioeconomic level of the clients served and the breadth of outreach represents 
the number of poor served (Hermes & Lensink, 2007). The majority of previous studies had focused depth of 
outreach for the measurement of social performance while analyzing its effect on the financial performance of 
MFPs, like Meyer (2019), Abdullah and Quayes (2016), and Quayes (2012, 2015). According to Mia and Chandran 
(2016), it is the subjective choice of researcher to decide upon which proxies to for social outreach. Percentage of 
female borrowers and average loan outstanding per borrower are the most commonly used proxies of depth of 
outreach (Robert Cull & Morduch, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Meyer, 2019; Quayes, 2012, 2015).  Thus, current 
study also used depth of outreach and represented it through the proxies of percentage of women borrowers and 
the average outstanding loan balance per borrower of MFPs in Pakistan for current study.  
Previous studies have not agreed on the issue of how outreach affects the financial performance and it is yet, 
unclear which are the best proxies of social outreach of MFPs (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). Therefore, the current 
study also uses two new measures of social outreach developed by Bibi et al. (2018). According to Bibi et al. (2018) 
their newly developed measures of social performance represent the breadth and depth of social outreach better 
than the traditional measures. Their first newly developed measure is a proxy of breadth of social outreach, named 
“market share of microfinance borrowers” (MSB) that is calculated as a ratio of total active borrowers of an MFPs 
to the total number of active borrowers of all MFPs in a Pakistan. Their second new measure is a proxy of depth 
of outreach, named as “Market share of the number of borrowers adjusted for market share of assets” (MSBA), 
calculated as the ratio of an MFP’s MSB to the proportion of an MFP’s assets to the total assets of all MFPs in 
Pakistan. This is a measure of depth of outreach. MSB and MSBA are negatively associated with each other Bibi 
et al. (2018). According to Bibi et al. (2018) value for MSB will be less than one and greater than zero; the value 
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approaching one shows the wider breadth of outreach. Value of MSBA smaller than one shows less outreach with 
higher loan size whereas, the figure of larger than one represents smaller loans and more outreach.  
3.2.3 Control variables  
The current study uses multiple MFPs specific and country-specific macroeconomic control variables that could 
also affect the association between social outreach and FP of MFPs. The SIZE of MFPs is used as control variable, 
it affects the performance of MFPs (Robert Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Meyer, 2019). PAR30 shows 
the quality of loan portfolio, and it is used as control variable because the payment overdue risk of portfolio for 
more than 30 days affects the FP of MFPs (Bassem, 2012). operating expenses to average gross loan portfolio ratio 
measures the efficiency of MFPs and also affects its FP, which means how much has been spent for lending one 
unit of loan (Arrassen, 2017; Assefa et al., 2013; Bibi et al., 2018; Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & Molinero, 
2007; Kulkarni, 2017; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). Debt equity ratio is used to control the effect of leverage of 
MFPs because the financial structures of an MFPs influence its financial performance (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010; 
Conning, 1999; Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Meyer, 2019; Quayes, 2012). 
Macroeconomic variables affect the overall economy and also affect the Financial Performance of MFPs 
(Lopatta et al., 2017; Nasrin et al., 2018). The current study used inflation (INF) and gross domestic product per 
capita as the macroeconomic control variable. Inflation affects the cost of loans and the repayment rates; thus, it 
can affect the financial performance of MFPs (Assefa et al., 2013). As a result of increase in inflation in the country 
the customer base of MFPs may also increase (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005) and the FP can improve (Nasrin et 
al., 2018). FP is also affected by the change in gross domestic product of country (GDP) as it affects the repayment 
rate of MFPs (Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, Annim, & Gupta, 2011). The current study used the logarithm of GDP per 
capita (LNGDPC) in Pakistan as control (Adhikary & Papachristou, 2014).  
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
The current study intends to analyze the impact of outreach on the financial performance (FP) of MFPs in Pakistan, 
thorough ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Moreover, fixed effects and random effects are used for 
robustness. OLS multiple regression is useful to estimate the unknown parameters but it may suffer endogeneity 
issues due to simultaneous causation and unobserved heterogeneity (De-Min, 1973). FE is more useful to 
determine the causation among variables, while employing panel data even with feeble assumption and RE are 
more useful when causation is obvious (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). To establish causation, this study examines 
the relationship between social outreach indicators and financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan, using following 
regression equation: 
FP =  + 	PWB + LNALB + MSB + MSBA + OER + DER
+ PAR30 + SIZE +  INF + 	!lnGDP + % 
 
(1) 
In equation (1) FP stands for financial performance that is proxied through return on assets (ROA) and other 
alternative measures of PMR, YLD, and YLDR. MSB shows the Market share of borrowers. MSBA denotes the 
Market share of borrowers adjusted by market share of assets. PWB denotes the percentage of active number of 
women borrowers. LNALB is the natural logarithm of average loan size per borrower. OER indicates the ratio of 
operating expense to average gross loan portfolio. DER denotes Debt to equity ratio. PAR30 shows the Portfolio 
at risk 30 days. SIZE measures the natural log of total assets. LNGDPCt stands for natural logarithm of per capita 
GDP. INF represents the rate of inflation in the country. Ꜫ represents the error term. It had been assumed that the 
term Ꜫ is not correlated with any of the estimators (Fabra & Schmidheiny). MFPs are represented by the subscript 
i individually and it ranges from 1 to N. Time period is represented by the subscript t which ranges from 1 to T.  
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Table 1. Description of variables 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable   
ROA Net operating income / total assets 
PMR Ratio of net operating income by operating revenue 
YLD 
The total income from interest and fees on the outstanding loan portfolio 
(nominal). 
YLDR 
The total income from interest and fees on the outstanding loan portfolio 
(real) 
Explanatory variables   
PWB Fraction of active women borrowers in total active borrowers of MFPs 
LNALB Natural log of average loan outstanding per borrowers 
MSB 
Number of active borrowers divided by total borrowers of all MFPs in the 
country 
MSBA 
Market share of borrowers divided by market share of assets of all MFPs in 
the country 
Institutional control 
variables   
DER Debt to equity ratio 
OER Operating expense divided by average gross loan portfolio 
PAR30 Portfolio at risk 30 days 
SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Macroeconomic control 
variables   
INF Rate of inflation 
LNGDPC Natural log of GDP per capita 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics described as number (N), MEAN, standard deviation (SD), minimum (MIN) 
and maximum (MAX) of observations, respectively, for the variables of current study.  To reduce the effect of 
outliers, data is Winsorized at 1% level on both tails. The sample frame includes 38 MFPs of various types, which 
are located in different cities in Pakistan. The unbalanced panel dataset of current study includes the observations 
of 17 years from1998-2014. 
The minimum and maximum values of most variables vary enormously, from negative to positive. It shows 
that different MFPs have performed differently from one another. Some are good at FP and outreach the others are 
not. Negative values of the mean of ROA and PMR are -0.0541 and -0.855 showing that the MFPs, on average, 
are performing poorly on the profitability side. The average yield on gross portfolio nominal and real are more 
than 33 percent and 19 percent that shows that MFPs are charging their borrowers with a high-interest rate. 
Variation with respect to breadth and depth of outreach of MFPs, respectively is depicted from the minimum and 
maximum values of MSB and MSBA. Fraction of women borrower on average is 55.6 percent with huge variation 
among MFPs. It is far less than the average fraction of women borrowers around the world highlighted by Abdullah 
and Quayes (2016). Natural logarithm of average loan per borrower helps lower the variation problem.  
Mean of LNALB is 5.037 with a wide dispersion among MFPs shown by its SD of .866 points. It reflects the 
different preferences of outreach among different MFPs. Smaller loan size can increase the associated operating 
costs of MFPs thus leading to a higher OER (Rosenberg, 2009). Mean value for OER is 38.1% in Pakistan that is 
much higher than mean OER of the world MFPs reported as 29% by Imai et al. (2011). This is because the 
associated costs of providing MF services to poor of Pakistan are much higher than their earnings and depicted the 
lower efficiency of MFPs’s as compared to the rest of the world.  PAR30 on average for MFPs in Pakistan 8.06 
percent which is higher than the PAR30 of 6.2% across the globe among 947 MFPs (Chakravarty & Pylypiv, 2015). 
It signals the portfolio quality is lower than that of the MFPs around the world on average. Mean value of SIZE is 
15.33 which is lesser than the reported value of 16.53 for world MFPs as reported by Tchuigoua (2014). It shows 
the smaller asset base of MFPs in Pakistan than their global counterparts. DER mean is 2.02 that is more than 
double of standard of 1, shows that the MFPs in Pakistan are having high leverage that could have a magnified 
effect on their returns and they must be careful in the time of declining revenues. Average inflation during the 
study period was 10.1% and LNGDPC was 6.86.  
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4.2 Pairwise correlation 
To deal with the issue of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables before running multiple regression 
analyses, the current study constructed a pairwise correlation matrix as shown in Table 3. No issue of 
multicollinearity among the regressors, the values of pairwise correlation among the regressors in Table 3 are less 
than 0.8 threshold (Kennedy, 2008). 
Fixed effects model and random-effects model were used following Hoechle (2007), along with the OLS in 
this study. Results are shown in Tables 4. All models were found good fit, according to the F-statistics, Wald chi2, 
and R2. Table 4 contains the proxy measures of depth of outreach and breadth of outreach. Percentage of active 
women borrowers, average loan per borrower and market share of borrower adjusted by market share of assets for 
depth of outreach and for breadth of outreach market share of borrower, as explanatory variables along with the 
MFPs’ specific and macroeconomic control variables.  
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Dependent Variables      
ROA 244 -0.054 0.174 -1.113 0.194 
PMR 284 -0.855 3.556 -30.94 0.641 
YLD 242 0.332 0.742 -1.333 11.48 
YLDR 242 0.198 0.693 -1.305 10.62 
Explanatory Variables      
MSB 283 0.063 0.092 0.015 1.000 
MSBA 283 1.056 0.148 0.477 1.699 
PWB 259 0.556 0.340 0.000 1.000 
LNALB 279 5.037 0.866 0.000 9.078 
Control Variables      
OER 254 0.381 0.662 -1.333 7.894 
DER 298 2.020 11.08 -52.20 44.35 
PAR30 255 0.080 0.158 0.000 0.940 
SIZE 300 15.33 2.132 6.832 19.30 
INF 301 0.101 0.045 0.0291 0.203 
LNGDPC 301 6.806 0.294 6.119 7.132 
Number of MFPs 38 38 38 38 38 
 
4.3 Regression Results and Discussion 
Tale 4 illustrates the results of OLS, fixed effects and random effect models respectively for the response variable 
of FP proxied by ROA, PMR, YLD and YLDR for the microfinance industry in Pakistan. The percentage of 
women borrower (PWB) has significant positive relationship with ROA of MFPs in Pakistan, as depicted by the 
value and sign of estimated coefficient of PWB across OLS and random effect models. PWB and ROA relationship 
is significant at 5% in OLS model and at 10% in RE model as indicated by the p-values which is p<0.05 and p<0.1, 
respectively and it is insignificant in FE model. PWB has a positive effect on PMR in FE model, significant at a 
level of 5% but insignificant in OLS and RE. PWB showed a positive effect with both, YLD and YLDR at 
significance level of 1% in OLS model and remained insignificant in FE and RE models. The findings are 
consistent with some previous studies (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Hulme & Mosley, 1996).  
Alternative proxies have been used for firm performance to validate our results. Alternative proxies include 
PMR (profit Margin), YLD (Nominal Yield) and YLDR (Real yield). Results remain unchanged over all the 
proxies of financial performance in this study. An explanation for the better FP due to PWB could be that the 
women borrower had fewer opportunities to borrow than men so they maintain a better repayment rate while being 
more reliable than their male counterparts (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Women borrowers use loan efficiently 
in a riskier opportunity used to be less mobile, and mostly the first-time borrowers, thus maintain better repayment 
rate, lower defaults and a better FP (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016). Hence, hypothesis 1 is confirmed by the findings 
of the current study.   
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Table 3 Pairwise Correlation  
Variables PWB LNALB MSB MSBA OER SIZE PAR30 DER INF LNGDPC 
LNALB -0.425*** 1         
MSB -0.153** 0.386*** 1        
MSBA 0.253*** -0.528*** 0.268*** 1       
OER -0.163** 0.069 -0.129** -0.386*** 1      
SIZE -0.200*** 0.522*** -0.162*** -0.083 -0.153** 1     
PAR30 -0.247*** 0.017 -0.049 -0.240*** 0.052 -0.203*** 1    
DER -0.019 0.042 -0.018 -0.028 -0.04 0.052 -0.116* 1   
INF 0.124** -0.038 -0.236*** 0.154*** 0.029 0.081 -0.088 -0.059 1  
LNGDPC 0.190*** 0.012 -0.469*** -0.078 0.120* 0.325*** -0.195*** 0.032 0.446*** 1 
 
Table 4. Summary of regression results by OLS, FE and RE for ROA, PMR and YLD 
 (OLS) (FE) (RE) (OLS) (FE) (RE) (OLS) (FE) (RE) (OLS) (FE) (RE) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA PMR PMR PMR YLD YLD YLD YLDR YLDR YLDR 
PWB 0.0689** 0.0963 0.0646* 0.374 1.054** 0.435 0.0926*** 0.0682 0.0225 0.0794*** 0.0692 0.0217 
 (0.0311) (0.0584) (0.0382) (0.279) (0.408) (0.391) (0.0332) (0.0584) (0.0494) (0.0296) (0.0516) (0.0444) 
LNALB -0.0457* -0.0271 -0.0486 0.0721 -0.306 -0.198 0.0548* -0.0505 -0.0152 0.0432 -0.0526 -0.0222 
 (0.0273) (0.0388) (0.0297) (0.253) (0.267) (0.288) (0.0300) (0.0387) (0.0363) (0.0267) (0.0342) (0.0324) 
MSB -19.02*** -1.055 -14.60*** -144.3*** -9.257 -77.32** -12.78** -15.85*** -15.58*** -11.61** -14.48*** -14.19*** 
 (4.627) (4.735) (4.522) (43.42) (32.15) (37.37) (5.156) (4.617) (4.643) (4.601) (4.078) (4.122) 
MSBA 0.523** 0.00592 0.464** 4.443** -0.548 2.097 0.518** 0.743*** 0.567** 0.481** 0.702*** 0.540** 
 (0.209) (0.241) (0.206) (2.116) (1.696) (1.941) (0.253) (0.246) (0.244) (0.226) (0.217) (0.217) 
OPEXGLP -0.0574*** -0.0485*** -0.0498*** -0.546*** -0.249** -0.466*** 0.0390** -0.00726 0.0104 0.0422*** 0.00321 0.0169 
 (0.0167) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.147) (0.107) (0.125) (0.0174) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0136) (0.0137) 
LNSIZE 0.102*** 0.0924*** 0.0946*** 0.757*** 0.408** 0.717*** 0.0379** 0.0706*** 0.0536*** 0.0342** 0.0635*** 0.0492*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0254) (0.0187) (0.161) (0.177) (0.161) (0.0190) (0.0254) (0.0202) (0.0170) (0.0225) (0.0180) 
PAR30 -0.127* -0.215*** -0.144** -2.118*** -3.012*** -2.890*** -0.105 -0.185** -0.180** -0.107* -0.172*** -0.171*** 
 (0.0687) (0.0730) (0.0680) (0.602) (0.500) (0.568) (0.0712) (0.0722) (0.0710) (0.0636) (0.0637) (0.0631) 
DER 0.00125* 0.000609 0.000776 0.00845 0.00207 0.00338 0.000674 0.000907 0.000837 0.000651 0.000828 0.000773 
 (0.000752) (0.000696) (0.000727) (0.00663) (0.00483) (0.00586) (0.000784) (0.000692) (0.000725) (0.000699) (0.000612) (0.000642) 
INF -145.0*** -0.436 -112.0*** -1,060*** 7.121 -572.0* -73.53*** -80.06*** -82.40*** -72.73*** -80.12*** -81.52*** 
 (36.70) (5.111) (36.07) (337.1) (34.31) (294.0) (22.44) (20.81) (20.59) (20.02) (18.38) (18.30) 
LNGDPC -5.685*** -0.340 -4.436*** -42.63*** 6.021 -23.76** 3.926*** 4.065*** 4.274*** 3.825*** 4.035*** 4.181*** 
 (1.357) (4.995) (1.319) (12.94) (33.21) (11.08) (1.106) (1.030) (1.019) (0.987) (0.910) (0.905) 
CONSTANT 50.13*** 1.074 38.78*** 371.5*** -47.93 202.2** -22.97*** -23.57*** -24.56*** -22.31*** -23.36*** -24.00*** 
 (12.09) (35.90) (11.80) (114.8) (239.0) (98.95) (6.388) (5.926) (5.862) (5.701) (5.234) (5.210) 
OBSERVATIONS 211 211 211 216 216 216 210 210 210 210 210 210 
R-SQUARED 0.383 0.305  0.415 0.388  0.347 0.278  0.368 0.360  
NUMBER OF ID  35 35  39 39  38 38  38 38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Further, our results illustrate that the average loan per borrower (LNALB) is negatively associated with ROA 
as depicted by the coefficient value of OLS estimate (-0.0457) and significant at 10%. This relationship turns 
insignificant in other models as well as by using alternative proxies of financial performance. LNABPL is an 
inverse measure of social outreach that means smaller loan size indicates the greater depth of outreach (Quayes, 
2012), the greater the average loan size per borrower smaller is the depth of outreach which ultimately decreases 
the financial performance. One of the possible reasons for the decrease in financial performance is that bigger size 
borrowers may use their influence to gain bigger size loans, although they do not make it enough productive which 
can increase default risk, and lead to lower profitability of banks. In response to the lower profitability, MFPs 
charge higher interest rates to cover the operating cost which results in higher yield. These findings confirm the 
hypothesis 2 of the present study. 
Results further reveal that there is a negative significant relationship between market share of number of 
borrowers (MSB) and ROA as depicted by the value and sign of coefficient -19.02 and p<0.01. This is consistent 
across all the models and by using alternative proxies. One of the possible reasons is that when the breadth of 
outreach increases the number of borrowers per MFPs increases, which reduces the efficiency of monitoring role 
of banks and can possibly lead to poor financial performance. Therefore, the results confirm the hypothesis 3 that 
MSBA has a significant relationship with the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan. 
Findings suggest a positive and significant relationship between adjusted market share of borrowers and ROA 
across all the models and by using alternative proxies of financial performance. The possible explanation for these 
findings could be the economies of scale that are reflected by a larger asset base of MFPs. Hypothesis 4 is accepted 
as the depth of outreach has a positive impact on financial performance of MFPs.   
Results for control variables are also significant and according to the literature. The relationship of operating 
expenses with ROA is negative and significant at 1% and 5% level in all models except fixed and random effects 
of YLD an YLDR. This result implies that as operating expenses increase the profitability tends to decline. These 
findings are also in line with previous literature (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Meyer, 2019; Quayes, 2015). There 
is a positive association between size of MFPs and performance as indicated by the coefficient and p values. Larger 
banks achieved economies of scale; therefore, their profitability increases with the increase in size. PAR30 is 
negatively associated with MFPs financial performance because PAR30 indicates the default risk and as default 
risk or repayment delay increases the financial performance would be harmed. DER have weak positive impact on 
ROA as depicted by the p-value which is 10% and this relationship turns insignificant in all other models and 
alternative proxies of performance. The inflation rate of the country is negatively significantly associated with 
MFPs financial performance. Because inflation negatively affects the repayment capacity of borrowers which 
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increases the default risk and harms financial performance. Moreover, with rising inflation rate the cost of 
borrowing for MFPs also increases and decreases the profit margin. GDP per capita is negatively associated with 
profitability and positively associated with yield. Because as GDP per capita increases leads to decrease in poverty, 
therefore, decreased demand for MFPs loans which in turn decreases the profit of MFPs. This decrease in MFPs 
loans could lead to the higher interest rates charged by MFPs thus leads to higher YLD and YLDR.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of outreach on the financial performance of MFPs in Pakistan by using a sample 
of 38 MFPs for the period of 1998-2014. Results suggest that there is significant and positive association between 
depth of outreach and financial performance. The empirical evidence shows that the percentage of women 
borrowers has a significant positive impact on the financial performance of MFPs. Because female borrowers are 
more efficient in repayment and also efficient in utilizing the amount borrowed. Average loan size per borrower 
found to be negatively associated with financial performance of MFPs. Because larger average loan size limits the 
repayment capacity and increases the burden of amount borrowed that leads higher default rate and in turn harm 
the financial performance of MFPs. The depth of outreach as measured by adjusted market share of borrowers also 
has a positive effect on financial performance of MFPs. Larger assets base increase operational efficiency and help 
achieve economies of scale which leads toward improved financial performance.   
The current study has both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, current study provides 
empirical support to welfarist approach, suggests that social outreach deepening can improve the financial 
performance of MFPs across Pakistan, and our findings suggest that simultaneous achievement of the dual mission 
of social outreach and better financial performance can be achievable.  
Policy implications for the donors and governments are as follows: the supply of subsidies should be 
continuous and certain in order to help MFPs meet goals by covering part of associated costs of widening the 
breadth or scale of social outreach. Top managers of MFPs can take findings of the current study into consideration 
while decision making and specifically they should enhance the social outreach program, and besides enhancing 
the outreach program they should also maintain the efficiency of operations, which can help them to make the best 
use of the program and increase the organizational financial performance. Moreover, extending the breadth of 
outreach should be accompanied by larger asset base and cost efficiency of operations for better FP. 
We acknowledge that there are some limitations of the study, and future studies can address those limitations. 
Due to limited availability of data, we could not examine the impact of some social outreach indicators on financial 
performance, for instance including poverty level of borrowers accessed. The current study can be replicated in 
some other country of South Asia.  
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